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We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the
revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the
AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives Ω , a collection E of
subsets of Ω (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E → 2Ω (representing
choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on Ω
such that, for every E ∈ E , f (E) coincides with the best elements of E relative to R .
We re-interpret choice structures in terms of belief revision. An interpretation is obtained
by adding a valuation V that assigns to every atom p the subset of Ω at which p is
true. Associated with an interpretation is an initial belief set and a partial belief revision
function. A choice frame is AGM-consistent if, for every interpretation of it, the associated
partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revision function
that satisﬁes the AGM postulates. It is shown that a ﬁnite choice frame is AGM-consistent
if and only if it is rationalizable.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The dominant theory of belief revision is due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] and is known as the AGM
theory. In their approach beliefs are modeled syntactically as sets of formulas and belief revision is construed as an operation
that associates with every deductively closed set of formulas K (thought of as the initial beliefs) and formula φ (thought of
as new information) a new set of formulas BK (φ) representing the new beliefs after revising by φ.
We establish a correspondence between the AGM theory and the set-theoretic structures studied in rational choice theory
(also known as revealed preference theory; see, for example, [22] and [24]). Rational choice theory considers structures
〈Ω,E, f 〉 consisting of a set of alternatives Ω , a collection E of subsets of Ω (representing possible choice sets) and a
function f from E into the set of subsets of Ω , representing choices made. The main objective of rational choice theory is
to investigate the conditions under which the function f can be rationalized by a total pre-order R on Ω in the sense that,
for every E ∈ E , f (E) coincides with the best elements of E relative to R .
We re-interpret choice structures in terms of belief revision. The set Ω is now interpreted as a set of states. A model
based on (or an interpretation of) a choice structure is obtained by adding to it a valuation V that assigns to every atomic
formula p the set of states at which p is true. Truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is then obtained as usual. Given a
model 〈Ω,E, f , V 〉 we deﬁne the initial beliefs as the set of formulas φ such that f (Ω) is a subset of the truth set of φ,
denoted by ‖φ‖. Hence f (Ω) is interpreted as the set of states that are initially considered possible. We then interpret the
collection of events (sets of states) E as a set of possible items of information. If φ is a formula such that ‖φ‖ ∈ E , we deﬁne
the revised beliefs upon learning that φ as the set of formulas ψ such that f (‖φ‖) ⊆ ‖ψ‖. Thus the event f (‖φ‖) is interpreted
as the set of states that are considered possible after learning that φ is the case. Hence associated with every model is a
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every piece of information is potentially available or contemplated). We say that a choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is AGM-consistent
if, for every model based on it, the associated partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revision
function that satisﬁes the AGM postulates. We show that, when the set of states is ﬁnite, the properties of AGM-consistency
and rationalizability are equivalent.
In the next section we review the notion of belief function and the AGM postulates. In Section 3 we develop the corre-
spondence between AGM belief revision and rational choice. Section 4 contains a brief discussion of related literature and
concluding remarks.
2. Belief revision functions
Let Φ be the set of formulas of a propositional language based on a countable set A of atomic formulas.2 Given a subset
K ⊆ Φ , its PL-deductive closure [K ]P L (where ‘PL’ stands for Propositional Logic) is deﬁned as follows: ψ ∈ [K ]P L if and only
if there exist φ1, . . . , φn ∈ K (with n  0) such that (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) → ψ is a tautology (that is, a theorem of Propositional
Logic). A set K ⊆ Φ is consistent if [K ]P L 	= Φ (equivalently, if there is no formula φ such that both φ and ¬φ belong to
[K ]P L ). A set K ⊆ Φ is deductively closed if K = [K ]P L . A belief set is a set K ⊆ Φ which is deductively closed.
Let K be a consistent belief set representing the agent’s initial beliefs and let Ψ ⊆ Φ be a set of formulas representing
possible items of information. A belief revision function based on K is a function BK : Ψ → 2Φ (where 2Φ denotes the set of
subsets of Φ) that associates with every formula φ ∈ Ψ (thought of as new information) a set BK (φ) ⊆ Φ (thought of as the
revised beliefs).3 If Ψ 	= Φ then BK is called a partial belief revision function, while if Ψ = Φ then BK is called a full belief
revision function.
Deﬁnition 1. Let BK : Ψ → 2Φ be a (partial) belief revision function and B∗K : Φ → 2Φ a full belief revision function. We say
that B
∗
K is an extension of BK if, for every φ ∈ Ψ , B
∗
K (φ) = BK (φ).
A full belief revision function is called an AGM function if it satisﬁes the following properties, known as the AGM postu-
lates: ∀φ,ψ ∈ Φ ,
(AGM1) BK (φ) = [BK (φ)]P L ,
(AGM2) φ ∈ BK (φ),
(AGM3) BK (φ) ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}]P L ,
(AGM4) if ¬φ /∈ K , then [K ∪ {φ}]P L ⊆ BK (φ),
(AGM5) BK (φ) = Φ if and only if φ is a contradiction,
(AGM6) if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then BK (φ) = BK (ψ),
(AGM7) BK (φ ∧ψ) ⊆ [BK (φ)∪ {ψ}]P L ,
(AGM8) if ¬ψ /∈ BK (φ), then [BK (φ)∪ {ψ}]P L ⊆ BK (φ ∧ψ).
AGM1 requires the revised belief set to be deductively closed. AGM2 requires that the information be believed. AGM3
says that beliefs should be revised minimally, in the sense that no new formula should be added unless it can be deduced
from the information received and the initial beliefs.4 AGM4 says that if the information received is compatible with the
initial beliefs, then any formula that can be deduced from the information and the initial beliefs should be part of the
revised beliefs. AGM5 requires the revised beliefs to be consistent, unless the information φ is a contradiction (that is, ¬φ
is a tautology). AGM6 requires that if φ is propositionally equivalent to ψ then the result of revising by φ be identical to
the result of revising by ψ . AGM7 and AGM8 are a generalization of AGM3 and AGM4 that
“applies to iterated changes of belief. The idea is that if BK (φ) is a revision of K [prompted by φ] and BK (φ) is to be
changed by adding further sentences, such a change should be made by using expansions of BK (φ) whenever possible.
More generally, the minimal change of K to include both φ and ψ (that is, BK (φ ∧ ψ)) ought to be the same as the
expansion of BK (φ) by ψ , so long as ψ does not contradict the beliefs in BK (φ)” (Gärdenfors [12], p. 55; notation
changed to match ours).5
We now turn to a semantics for belief revision, using structures that are known in rational choice theory as choice
functions. We shall call them choice frames.
2 Thus Φ is deﬁned recursively as follows: if p ∈ A then p ∈ Φ and if φ,ψ ∈ Φ then ¬φ ∈ Φ and (φ ∨ψ) ∈ Φ .
3 In the literature it is common to use the notation K ∗φ or K ∗ φ instead of BK (φ), but for our purposes the latter notation is clearer.
4 For every formula ψ , ψ ∈ [K ∪ {φ}]P L if and only if (φ → ψ) ∈ K (since, by hypothesis, K = [K ]P L ).
5 The expansion of BK (φ) by ψ is [BK (φ) ∪ {ψ}]P L . Note, again, that, for every formula χ , χ ∈ [BK (φ) ∪ {ψ}]P L if and only if (ψ → χ) ∈ BK (φ) (since,
by AGM1, BK (φ) = [BK (φ)]P L ).
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Deﬁnition 2. A choice frame is a triple 〈Ω,E, f 〉 where
Ω is a non-empty set of states (or possible worlds); subsets of Ω are called events.
E ⊆ 2Ω is a collection of events (2Ω denotes the set of subsets of Ω) such that ∅ /∈ E and Ω ∈ E .
f : E → 2Ω is a function that associates with every event E ∈ E an event f (E) satisfying the following properties:
(1) f (E) ⊆ E and (2) f (E) 	= ∅.
In rational choice theory a set E ∈ E is interpreted as a set of available alternatives and f (E) is interpreted as the subset
of E which consists of the chosen alternatives (see, for example, [22] and [24]). In our case, we think of the elements of
E as possible items of information and the interpretation of f (E) is that, if informed that event E has occurred, the agent
considers as possible all and only the states in f (E). The set f (Ω) is interpreted as the states that are initially considered
possible.6
In order to interpret a choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 in terms of belief revision we need to add a valuation V : A → 2Ω that
associates with every atomic formula p ∈ A the set of states at which p is true. The quadruple 〈Ω,E, f , V 〉 is called a
model (or an interpretation) of 〈Ω,E, f 〉. Given a model M = 〈Ω,E, f , V 〉, truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is deﬁned
recursively as follows (ω |M φ means that formula φ is true at state ω in model M):
(1) for p ∈ A, ω |M p if and only if ω ∈ V (p), (2) ω |M ¬φ if and only if ω 	|M φ and (3) ω |M (φ ∨ ψ) if
and only if either ω |M φ or ω |M ψ (or both). The truth set of formula φ in model M is denoted by ‖φ‖M . Thus
‖φ‖M = {ω ∈ Ω: ω |M φ}.7
Given a model M = 〈Ω,E, f , V 〉 we say that
• the agent initially believes that ψ if and only if f (Ω) ⊆ ‖ψ‖M ,
• the agent believes that ψ upon learning that φ if and only if (1) ‖φ‖M ∈ E and (2) f (‖φ‖M) ⊆ ‖ψ‖M .
Accordingly, we can associate with every model a (partial) belief revision function as follows. Let
KM =
{
φ ∈ Φ: f (Ω) ⊆ ‖φ‖M
}
, 8 ΨM =
{
φ ∈ Φ: ‖φ‖M ∈ E
}
,
BKM : ΨM → 2Φ given by BKM(φ) =
{
ψ ∈ Φ: f (‖φ‖M)⊆ ‖ψ‖M}. (1)
We address the following question: what properties must a choice frame satisfy in order for it to be the case that the
(typically partial) belief revision function associated with an arbitrary interpretation (or model) of it can be extended to a
full AGM belief revision function? This is the motivation for the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. A choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is AGM-consistent if, for every model M = 〈Ω,E, f , V 〉 based on it, the (partial) belief
revision function BKM associated with M (see (1)) can be extended (see Deﬁnition 1) to a full belief revision function that
satisﬁes the AGM postulates.
We want to ﬁnd necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a choice frame to be AGM-consistent.
Remark 4. It is shown in Appendix A (Lemma 17) that a necessary condition for AGM-consistency is the following, which
is known in the rational choice literature as Arrow’s Axiom (see [24], p. 25):
∀E, F ∈ E, if E ⊆ F and E ∩ f (F ) 	= ∅ then f (E) = E ∩ f (F ). (2)
Arrow’s Axiom, however, is not suﬃcient for AGM-consistency, as the following example shows:9
6 Notice that, in general, E may be a “small” subset of 2Ω . In the revealed preference approach, this is because one might only have a limited number of
observations concerning the choices made by an individual (given menu sets E1, . . . , En the agent was observed choosing f (E1), . . . , f (En), respectively).
In the belief revision interpretation, an introspective agent (e.g. a doctor) might consider how she would change her beliefs if she received various pieces
of information (e.g. laboratory results), but might be able, or willing, to consider only a limited number of possible items of information.
7 A valuation V (and corresponding model M) associates with every state ω ∈ Ω a maximally consistent set of formulas m(ω) = {φ ∈ Φ: ω |M φ}. Let
M denote the set of maximally consistent sets of formulas. Then a valuation is equivalent to a choice of a label function from Ω to M (see [19] and [21]).
8 It is straightforward to show that, for every model M, KM is a consistent and deductively closed set (a proof can be found in [8]).
9 Another well-known condition, which is necessary but not suﬃcient for AGM-consistency, is the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP):
if E, F ∈ E, x, y ∈ E ∩ F , x ∈ f (E) and y ∈ f (F ) then x ∈ f (F )
(equivalently, if E, F ∈ E , E ∩ f (F ) 	= ∅ and f (E)∩ F 	= ∅ then E ∩ f (F ) = f (E)∩ F ).
WARP is stronger than Arrow’s Axiom as can be seen in the example of Fig. 1, which satisﬁes Arrow’s Axiom but not WARP (take E = {α,β,γ }
and F = {β,γ , δ}). To see that WARP is not suﬃcient for AGM-consistency consider the following frame: Ω = {α,β,γ , δ}, E = {Ω, {α,β}, {β,γ }, {a, γ }},
f (Ω) = {δ}, f ({α,β}) = {α}, f ({β,γ }) = {β} and f ({α,γ }) = {γ }. This frame satisﬁes WARP vacuously, but is not rationalizable (see Deﬁnition 5 and
Proposition 6) and thus, by Proposition 8, is not AGM-consistent.
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Ω = {α,β,γ , δ, ε}, E = {Ω, {α,β,γ }, {β,γ , δ}},
f (Ω) = {ε}, f ({α,β,γ })= {γ } and f ({β,γ , δ})= {β,γ }.
This choice frame is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the elements of E are shown as rectangles and the values of the function
f are shown as ovals inside the rectangles. This choice frame satisﬁes Arrow’s Axiom trivially (for E, F ∈ E , E ⊆ F if and
only if F = Ω and, for every E ∈ E\{Ω}, f (Ω) ∩ E = ∅). Consider the model based on this frame where, for some atoms
p,q, r and s, ‖p‖ = {α,β,γ }, ‖q‖ = {β,γ , δ}, ‖r‖ = {β,γ } and ‖s‖ = {γ }. The initial beliefs are given by the consistent and
deductively closed set K = {φ ∈ Φ: ε | φ}. For every formula φ such that ‖φ‖ ∈ E , let BK (φ) = {ψ ∈ Φ: f (‖φ‖) ⊆ ‖ψ‖} be
the revised beliefs after receiving information φ. It is straightforward to check that {(q ∧ r), s} ⊆ BK (p) and (p ∧ r) ∈ BK (q)
while s /∈ BK (q) (since f (‖q‖) = {β,γ }  {γ } = ‖s‖). Since s ∈ BK (p) and s /∈ BK (q),
BK (p) 	= BK (q). (3)
Suppose that B∗K : Φ → 2Φ is an AGM function that extends BK . Since (q ∧ r) ∈ BK (p) = B∗K (p) and B∗K (p) is consistent,
¬(q∧r) /∈ B∗K (p). It follows from AGM7 and AGM8 that B∗K (p∧(q∧r)) = [B∗K (p)∪{(q∧r)}]P L = [B∗K (p)]P L = B∗K (p). Similarly,
since (p ∧ r) ∈ BK (q) = B∗K (q), by AGM7 and AGM8 B∗K (q∧ (p ∧ r)) = B∗K (q). Furthermore, since (p ∧ (q∧ r)) ↔ (q∧ (p ∧ r))
is a tautology, it follows from AGM6 that B∗K (p ∧ (q ∧ r)) = B∗K (q ∧ (p ∧ r)). Hence B∗K (p) = B∗K (q). Since B∗K is an extension
of BK , B∗K (p) = BK (p) and B∗K (q) = BK (q), yielding a contradiction with (3).
In rational choice theory a choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is said to be rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order10 R on Ω
such that, for every E ∈ E , f (E) is the set of best elements of E relative to R (see Deﬁnition 5 below). In that context, the
relation R is interpreted as a preference relation (ωRω′ if and only if ω is considered to be at least as good as ω′). In our
case R can be interpreted as a plausibility relation: ωRω′ if and only if state ω is considered to be at least as plausible as
state ω′ . Given this interpretation, if the frame is rationalizable then, after receiving information E , the agent considers as
possible (according to his revised beliefs) all and only the states that are most plausible among the ones in E .
Deﬁnition 5. A choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on Ω such that, for every E ∈ E ,
f (E) = bestR E def= {ω ∈ E: ωRω′,∀ω′ ∈ E}.11
The following proposition, due to Hansson ([16], Theorem 7, p. 455) gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
choice frame to be rationalizable.
Proposition 6. A choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is rationalizable if and only if it satisﬁes the following property: for every sequence
〈E1, . . . , En, En+1〉 in E with En+1 = E1 , if Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅, ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, then Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) = f (Ek)∩ Ek+1, ∀k = 1, . . . ,n.
For instance, in the example illustrated in Fig. 1, letting n = 2, E1 = {α,β,γ }, E2 = {β,γ , δ} and E3 = E1 we have that
E1 ∩ f (E2) = {β,γ } 	= ∅ and E2 ∩ f (E1) = {γ } 	= ∅ and thus E1 ∩ f (E2) 	= E2 ∩ f (E1), so that, by Proposition 6, the frame
is not rationalizable.
10 A binary relation R ⊆ Ω ×Ω is a total pre-order if it satisﬁes the following properties:
Completeness: ∀ω,ω′ ∈ Ω , either ωRω′ or ω′Rω (or both);
Transitivity: ∀ω,ω′,ω′′ ∈ Ω , if ωRω′ and ω′Rω′′ then ωRω′′ .
Note that completeness implies reﬂexivity (∀ω ∈ Ω , ωRω).
11 In the rational choice literature the preference relation is usually denoted by  and the set {ω ∈ E: ω  ω′,∀ω′ ∈ E} is referred to as the set of maximal
elements of E . In the artiﬁcial intelligence literature, the preference or plausibility relation is usually denoted by  and the set {ω ∈ E: ω ω′,∀ω′ ∈ E}
is referred to as the set of minimal elements of E . In order to avoid confusion, we denote the relation by R and refer to the best elements of a set.
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AGM-consistency and the second that, when Ω is countable, AGM-consistency implies rationalizability.
Proposition 7. Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a choice frame where Ω is ﬁnite. If 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is rationalizable then it is AGM-consistent.
Proposition 8. Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a choice frame where Ω is a (possibly inﬁnite) countable set. If 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is AGM-consistent then it is
rationalizable.
Putting together Propositions 7 and 8 we get that, when the set of states is ﬁnite, the two properties of AGM-consistency
and rationalizability are equivalent.
Corollary 9. Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a choice frame where Ω is ﬁnite. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is AGM-consistent,
(b) 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is rationalizable.
The restriction to ﬁnite frames in Proposition 7 can be dropped if the frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is rationalizable by a total pre-
order R that satisﬁes the property that every non-empty subset of Ω has a best element.
Deﬁnition 10. A choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is strongly rationalizable if it is rationalizable by a total pre-order R ⊆ Ω × Ω such
that, for every non-empty E ⊆ Ω , bestR E 	= ∅.12
A rationalizable choice frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 where Ω is ﬁnite is strongly rationalizable. Thus Proposition 7 is a corollary of
the following result (a proof can be found in [8]).
Proposition 11. Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a strongly rationalizable choice frame. Then 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is AGM-consistent.
4. Related literature and conclusion
Choice frames provide a semantics for AGM belief revision which can be considered an extension of Grove’s [15] system
of spheres semantics to the class of partial belief revision functions. In Appendix A we review the notion of system of
spheres and prove Propositions 7 and (a weaker version of) 8 using Grove’s characterization of AGM functions.13
Choice frames offer a Kripke-style (Kripke [20]) semantics for belief revision. Recently there have been several attempts
to model belief revision along the lines pioneered by Hintikka [17] for static beliefs, namely using a modal logic framework
that, on the semantic side, relies on Kripke-style structures. Important work in this new area was done by Segerberg [23]
in the context of dynamic doxastic logic, Board [5] in the context of multi-agent doxastic logic and van Benthem [3] in the
context of dynamic epistemic logic (see also [2], [9] and the recent survey in [10]). More closely related to the analysis
of this paper is Bonanno [6] where belief revision is studied within a temporal logic, which, on the semantic side, relies
on branching-time frames where with each instant are associated two relations, one representing beliefs and the other
representing information. As shown in [7], one can view such branching-time frames as a temporal generalization of the
choice frames considered in this paper.
We conclude by noting that Corollary 9 can be viewed as analogous to the frame characterization results of modal logic
(see, for example, [4]): given a ﬁnite rationalizable choice frame, every model based on it gives rise to a partial belief revision
function which can be extended to a full AGM function and, conversely, a frame with this property must be rationalizable.
Appendix A
We shall prove Proposition 7 using Grove’s [15] notion of system of spheres, which we recall below. As before, let A
be an inﬁnitely countable set of atoms and Φ the set of propositional formulas built on A. Let M be the set of maximally
12 A rationalizable frame may fail to be strongly rationalizable. For example, let N denote the set of natural numbers and let Ω = N ∪ {∞}. Let G be
the set of ﬁnite subsets of N and E = G ∪ {Ω}. Finally, let f (Ω) = {∞} and, for every E ∈ G, let f (E) be the largest number in E . Then the choice frame
〈Ω,E, f 〉 so deﬁned is rationalizable by the total pre-order  (with the convention that ∞ > n for every n ∈ N). However, it is not strongly rationalizable.
Suppose it were strongly rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order R on Ω . Then ∅ 	= bestRN ⊆ N. Fix an arbitrary n ∈ bestRN and let E = {n,n + 1}. By
hypothesis, f (E) = bestR E . Since E ⊆ N and E ∩ bestRN 	= ∅,
bestR E = E ∩ bestRN =
{ {n} if n+ 1 /∈ bestRN,
{n,n + 1} if n+ 1 ∈ bestRN.
But f (E) = {n+ 1}, yielding a contradiction.
13 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for pointing out these simpler proofs.
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formula φ we shall write Mφ instead of M{φ} .
Deﬁnition 12. A system of spheres centered on X ⊆ M is a collection S of subsets of M satisfying the following properties:
(S.1) For all U , V ∈ S , either U ⊆ V or V ⊆ U ;
(S.2) X is the smallest element of S , that is, X ∈ S and, for every U ∈ S , X ⊆ U ;
(S.3) M ∈ S;
(S.4) If φ is a consistent formula, then there exists a smallest sphere in S denoted by S(φ) intersecting Mφ (if φ is a
contradiction, deﬁne S(φ) to be M).
Notation 13. For every M ⊆ M, let [M] = {φ ∈ Φ: φ ∈ x,∀x ∈ M}.
Theorem 14. (See Grove [15].) If K ⊆ Φ is a consistent belief set and S a system of spheres centered on MK then the function
B∗K : Φ → 2Φ deﬁned by B∗K (φ) = [S(φ) ∩ Mφ] is an AGM function based on K . Conversely, if B∗K is an AGM function based on a
consistent belief set K , then there exists a system of spheres S centered on MK such that, for every formula φ , B∗K (φ) = [S(φ)∩ Mφ].
Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a frame and V a valuation, giving rise to the model M =〈Ω,E, f , V 〉. As noted in Footnote 7, we can
associate with M a function m : Ω → M as follows: m(ω) = {φ ∈ Φ: ω | φ}.14 For F ⊆ Ω let m(F ) = {m(ω): ω ∈ F }.
Clearly, for every formula φ, m(‖φ‖) ⊆ Mφ . By deﬁnition of K (see (1)), K = [m( f (Ω))]; furthermore, for every formula
φ ∈ Φ , if ‖φ‖ = E ∈ E , then[
m
(
f (E)
)]= BK (φ). (4)
In fact, for every formula ψ , ψ ∈ [m( f (E))] ⇔ ψ ∈ x,∀x ∈m( f (E)) ⇔ ψ ∈m(ω),∀ω ∈ f (E) ⇔ ω | ψ,∀ω ∈ f (E) ⇔ f (E) ⊆
‖ψ‖ ⇔ ψ ∈ BK (φ).
Proof of Proposition 7. 15 Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a ﬁnite rationalizable frame and let R be a total pre-order on Ω such that, for
every E ∈ E , f (E) = bestR E . For every ω ∈ Ω , let D(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω: ω′Rω} and let  = {D(ω): ω ∈ Ω}. Since Ω is ﬁnite,
 can be written as a sequence 〈D0, . . . , Dn〉 satisfying: (i) D0 = f (Ω), (ii) D j ⊂ D j+1, for all j = 0, . . . ,n − 1, (iii) Dn = Ω
and (iv) for every E ∈ E , since f (E) = bestR E 	= ∅, f (E) = E ∩ Dr(E) where r(E) is the smallest index j ∈ {0, . . . ,n} such that
E ∩ D j 	= ∅.16 Let S = {m(D0), . . . ,m(Dn),M}. We ﬁrst show that S is a system of spheres centered on m(D0) =m( f (Ω)).
Since, D j ⊂ D j+1 it is clear that m(D j) ⊆ m(D j+1), for every j = 0, . . . ,n − 1.17 Thus (S.1) and (S.2) of Deﬁnition 12 are
satisﬁed; (S.3) is satisﬁed by construction and (S.4) is satisﬁed because of ﬁniteness of S . It follows from Theorem 14 that
the function B∗K : Φ → 2Φ deﬁned by B∗K (φ) = [S(φ) ∩ Mφ] is an AGM belief revision function. We need to show that B∗K
is an extension of BK (φ), that is, that if ‖φ‖ ∈ E then [S(φ) ∩ Mφ] = BK (φ). Let φ be such that ‖φ‖ = E ∈ E , so that
m(E) ⊆ Mφ . Since f (E) = E ∩ Dr(E) , S(φ) = m(Dr(E)), so that m( f (E)) = m(E ∩ Dr(E)) ⊆ S(φ) ∩ Mφ. Thus [S(φ) ∩ Mφ] ⊆
[m( f (E))] and, therefore, by (4), [S(φ) ∩ Mφ] ⊆ BK (φ). For the converse, let ψ ∈ BK (φ); then f (E) ⊆ ‖ψ‖. Suppose that
ψ /∈ [S(φ)∩ Mφ]. Then there exists an x ∈ S(φ)∩ Mφ such that ψ /∈ x. Since S(φ) =m(Dr(E)), there exists an ω ∈ Dr(E) such
that x = m(ω). Since x ∈ Mφ and ‖φ‖ = E , ω ∈ E . Thus ω ∈ E ∩ Dr(E) = f (E) so that, since f (E) ⊆ ‖ψ‖, ω | ψ , that is,
ψ ∈ x=m(ω), yielding a contradiction. 
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 8. For the case where the frame 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is such that E is a countable set,
Proposition 8 can also be proved using Grove’s approach. First of all, as Grove ([15], p. 160) notes, a system of spheres
centered on X is equivalent to a total pre-order  on M that satisﬁes the following properties:
(S  1) X =minM (where, for every T ⊆ M, min T = {x ∈ T : x y,∀y ∈ T }),
(S  2) if φ is a consistent formula, then minMφ 	= ∅.
Theorem 14 can thus be restated in terms of a total pre-order  on M. We shall make use of the following related result
in Gärdenfors and Rott ([14], Theorem 4.4.1, p. 79), which, in turn, is based on a result of Katsuno and Mendelzon ([18],
Theorem 3.3, p. 269).18
14 Note that the function m in general is not injective, that is, it is possible that ω 	= ω′ and m(ω) = m(ω′). Furthermore, in general, m(Ω) is a proper
subset of M.
15 An alternative proof, that does not rely on Grove’s notion of system of spheres, is given in [8].
16 For a generalization of this see Freund ([11], Theorem 5, p. 246).
17 Note that it could be that m(D j) =m(D j+1) for some, or even all, j.
18 This result is also a consequence of the representation of rational inference relations by means of total pre-orders (see [19]) and the identity between
AGM revisions and rational relations (see [13]).
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only if there exists a total pre-order  on M such that, (1) MK =minM and (2) for every formula φ , MB∗K (φ) =minMφ .
When E is a countable set, the above theorem can be used to prove Proposition 8 by constructing a model where, for
every E ∈ E , there is an atom pE ∈ A such that ‖pE‖ = E .
Proof of Proposition 8 when E is countable. Let 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be an AGM-consistent frame where Ω and E are countable sets.
Construct a model where, for every ω ∈ Ω there is an atom pω ∈ A such that V (pω) = {ω} and for every E ∈ E\{Ω} there is
an atom pE ∈ A such that V (pE) = E . Let BK be the associated (partial) belief revision function and B∗K an AGM extension
of BK (it exists since the frame is AGM-consistent). By Theorem 15 there exists a total pre-order  of M such that
(a) MK =min M and
(b) for every φ ∈ Φ, MB∗K (φ) =min Mφ. (5)
Deﬁne R ⊆ Ω × Ω as follows: ωRω′ if and only if m(ω) m(ω′) (recall that m : Ω → M is deﬁned by m(ω) = {φ ∈
Φ: ω | φ}). First we show that f (Ω) = bestRΩ . Fix arbitrary ω ∈ f (Ω) and ω′ ∈ Ω . By deﬁnition of K (see (1)), m( f (Ω)) ⊆
MK . Thus, by (a) of (5), m(ω) m(ω′); hence ωRω′ . Since ω′ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that ω ∈ bestRΩ . Hence,
since ω ∈ f (Ω) was chosen arbitrarily, f (Ω) ⊆ bestRΩ . Suppose that bestRΩ  f (Ω). Then there exists an α ∈ bestRΩ such
that α /∈ f (Ω). Hence f (Ω) ⊆ ‖¬pα‖ = Ω\{α}, that is, ¬pα ∈ K so that ¬pα ∈ x for every x ∈ MK . Thus, since α | pα (that
is, pα ∈m(α)), m(α) /∈ MK . By deﬁnition of choice frame, f (Ω) 	= ∅. Fix a β ∈ f (Ω). Then m(β) ∈ MK and thus, by (a) of
(5), since m(α) /∈ MK , it is not the case that m(α)m(β). Hence it is not the case that αRβ , contradicting the hypothesis
that α ∈ bestRΩ .
Now let E ∈ E with E 	= Ω . We want to show that f (E) = bestR E . Fix arbitrary ω ∈ f (E) ⊆ E = ‖pE‖ and ω′ ∈ E . Since
BK (pE ) = {φ ∈ Φ: f (E) ⊆ ‖φ‖}, m( f (E)) ⊆ MBK (pE ) . Thus, since m(E) ⊆ MpE , it follows from (b) of (5) that m(ω)m(ω′)
and thus ωRω′ . Hence f (E) ⊆ bestR E . Suppose that bestR E  f (E). Then there exists an α ∈ bestR E such that α /∈ f (E).
Hence f (E) ⊆ ‖¬pα‖, that is, ¬pα ∈ BK (pE ) so that ¬pα ∈ x for every x ∈ MBK (pE ) . Thus, since α | pα (that is, pα ∈m(α)),
m(α) /∈ MBK (pE ) . By deﬁnition of choice frame, f (E) 	= ∅. Fix a β ∈ f (E). Then m(β) ∈ MBK (pE ) and thus, by (b) of (5), since
m(α) /∈ MBK (pE ) , it is not the case that m(α)m(β). Hence it is not the case that αRβ , contradicting the hypothesis that
α ∈ bestR E . 
The assumption that E is a countable set is restrictive. For example, it rules out the case where Ω = N (the set of natural
numbers) and E = 2N . An alternative proof, which does not require the assumption that E is countable, is given below. This
proof may be of independent interest, since it is not based on the notion of system of spheres. Instead it relies on Hansson’s
result (Proposition 6). We begin with several lemmas. This ﬁrst lemma is well known and the proof is omitted (a proof is
given in [8]). The second lemma does not require any restrictions on the sets Ω and E .
Lemma 16. Let H ⊆ Φ and ψ ∈ Φ . Then, for every formula χ , χ ∈ [H ∪ {ψ}]P L if and only if (ψ → χ) ∈ [H]P L .
Lemma 17. If 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is an AGM consistent choice frame then it satisﬁes Arrow’s Axiom: if E, F ∈ E are such that E ⊆ F and
E ∩ f (F ) 	= ∅ then f (E) = E ∩ f (F ).
Proof. Fix arbitrary E, F ∈ E such that E ⊆ F and E ∩ f (F ) 	= ∅ and suppose that f (E) 	= E ∩ f (F ). Then either E ∩ f (F ) 
f (E) or f (E)  E ∩ f (F ).
Case 1: E ∩ f (F )  f (E). Let ω ∈ E ∩ f (F ) be such that ω /∈ f (E). Construct a model based on this frame where,
for some atoms p, q and r, ‖p‖ = E , ‖q‖ = F and ‖r‖ = {ω}. Let BK be the associated (partial) belief revision function
and B∗K be an AGM extension of BK (it exists since, by hypothesis, the frame is AGM consistent). Since ‖p‖ = E ∈ E and
f (E) ⊆ E ⊆ F = ‖q‖, q ∈ BK (p) and thus q ∈ B∗K (p). Since p is not a contradiction, by AGM5 B∗K (p) is consistent. Thus¬q /∈ B∗K (p) and therefore, by AGM7 and AGM8,
B∗K (p ∧ q) =
[
B∗K (p)∪ {q}
]P L = [B∗K (p)]P L =(by AGM1) B∗K (p). (6)
Since ‖q‖ = F ∈ E , ‖p‖ = E and E ∩ f (F ) 	= ∅, ¬p /∈ BK (q) = B∗K (q). Thus, by AGM7 and AGM8, B∗K (q∧ p) = [B∗K (q)∪{p}]P L .
It follows from this and (6) that
B∗K (p) =
[
B∗K (q)∪ {p}
]P L
. (7)
Since ω /∈ f (E) and ‖r‖ = {ω}, f (E) ⊆ ‖¬r‖, that is, ¬r ∈ BK (p) and hence (since B∗K is an extension of BK )
¬r ∈ B∗K (p). (8)
Since ω ∈ E , ω ∈ ‖r ∧ p‖. Thus, since ω ∈ f (F ), f (F ) ∩ ‖r ∧ p‖ 	= ∅ so that f (F )  ‖¬(r ∧ p)‖ = ‖(p → ¬r)‖ and thus,
(p → ¬r) /∈ BK (q) = B∗ (q). Hence, by Lemma 16, ¬r /∈ [B∗ (q)∪ {p}]P L . This, together with (7), contradicts (8).K K
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construct a model where, for some atoms p, q and r, ‖p‖ = E , ‖q‖ = F and ‖r‖ = {ω}. A repetition of the argument used
above (leading to (6), making use of the hypotheses that E ⊆ F and E ∩ f (F ) 	= ∅) yields (7). Since ω /∈ f (F ) and ‖r‖ = {ω},
f (F ) ⊆ ‖¬r‖ and thus, since ‖q‖ = F , ¬r ∈ BK (q) = B∗K (q), which implies that
¬r ∈ [B∗K (q)∪ {p}]P L . (9)
On the other hand, since ω ∈ f (E) and ‖p‖ = E , ¬r /∈ BK (p) = B∗K (p). This, together with (7), contradicts (9). 
Deﬁnition 18. Let F = 〈Ω,E, f 〉 and F+ = 〈Ω,E+, f +〉 be two choice frames. We say that F+ is an extension of F if
E ⊆ E+ and, for every E ∈ E , f +(E) = f (E).
Lemma19. Let F = 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be an AGM-consistent choice framewhereΩ is a (possibly inﬁnite) countable set. Let 〈E1, . . . , En, En+1〉
be a sequence in E such that En+1 = E1 and, ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅. Let G = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En. Then there exists an exten-
sion F+ = 〈Ω,E+, f +〉 of F such that (i) E+ = E ∪ {G}, and (ii) ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, if Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅ then f +(Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G).
Furthermore, there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that E j ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅.
Proof. Let F = 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be an AGM-consistent frame where Ω is countable and ﬁx an arbitrary sequence E1, . . . , En+1 in
E such that En+1 = E1 and, ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅. Let G = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En . If G ∈ E , then the result follows from
Lemma 17 (take F+ = F and apply Arrow’s Axiom). Suppose, therefore, that G /∈ E . Construct a model based on this frame
where for every state ω ∈ Ω there is an atom pω such that ‖pω‖ = {ω}. Furthermore, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, let pi be an
atom such that ‖pi‖ = Ei . Let BK be the associated (partial) belief revision function and let B∗K be an AGM extension of BK
(it exists since, by hypothesis, F is AGM-consistent). Let
J = {i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}: ¬pi /∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn)}. (10)
First we show that J 	= ∅. Suppose that J = ∅. Then, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ¬pi ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). Hence, since (by
AGM1) B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) is deductively closed, (¬p1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬pn) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). Thus, since (¬p1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬pn) is
equivalent to ¬(p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn),
¬(p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (11)
By AGM2,
(p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (12)
Since (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) is not a contradiction, by AGM5, B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) is consistent, so that, for every formula φ, it is not
the case that both φ and ¬φ belong to B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn), contradicting (11) and (12). Thus J 	= ∅.
Deﬁne 〈Ω,E+, f +〉 as follows: E+ = E ∪ {G} (where G = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En); for every E ∈ E , f +(E) = f (E) and
f +(G) =
⋃
j∈ J
f (E j). (13)
Fix an arbitrary k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and suppose that Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅. We want to show that f +(Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G) (note that,
by deﬁnition of f + , f +(Ek) = f (Ek)).
First we show that k ∈ J . Suppose that k /∈ J , that is,
¬pk ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (14)
Since, by hypothesis, Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅, f +(G) 	= ∅ and thus, by (13), there exists an s ∈ J such that Ek ∩ f (Es) 	= ∅. Thus
f (Es)  Ω\Ek = ‖¬pk‖ and therefore ¬pk /∈ BK (ps). Since ‖ps‖ = Es ∈ E , BK (ps) = B∗K (ps). Thus
¬pk /∈ B∗K (ps). (15)
Since s ∈ J , ¬ps /∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). Thus, by AGM7 and AGM8 (and noting that ps is equivalent to ((p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn)∧ ps)),
B∗K (ps) =
[
B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn)∪ {ps}
]P L
. (16)
It follows from (15), (16) and Lemma 16 (and the fact that, by AGM1, B∗K (ps) = [B∗K (ps)]P L ) that
(ps → ¬pk) /∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (17)
Since (¬pk → (ps → ¬pk)) is a tautology and (by AGM1) B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) is deductively closed, (¬pk → (ps → ¬pk)) ∈
B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). It follows from this and (14) that (ps → ¬pk) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn), contradicting (17).
Thus we have shown that k ∈ J , that is,
¬pk /∈ B∗ (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (18)K
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Now we show the converse, namely that Ek ∩ f +(G) ⊆ f (Ek). Suppose not. Then there exists an α ∈ Ek ∩ f +(G) such
that α /∈ f (Ek), that is, f (Ek) ⊆ ‖¬pα‖, so that
¬pα ∈ BK (pk) = B∗K (pk). (19)
By (18) and AGM7 and AGM8 (and noting that (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) ∧ pk is equivalent to pk), B∗K (pk) = [B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) ∪
{pk}]P L . Hence, by (19) and Lemma 16,
(pk → ¬pα) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (20)
Since α ∈ f +(G), there exists an s ∈ J such that α ∈ f (Es). Thus ¬pα /∈ BK (ps) = B∗K (ps). Furthermore, since s ∈ J ,¬ps /∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) (see (10)), so that (16) holds and, therefore, by Lemma 16,
(ps → ¬pα) /∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (21)
Since α ∈ Ek , {α} = ‖pα‖ ⊆ ‖pk‖ = Ek, that is, ‖pα → pk‖ = Ω . Hence f (Es) ⊆ ‖pα → pk‖, that is, (pα → pk) ∈ BK (ps) =
B∗K (ps). Thus, by (16) and Lemma 16,(
ps → (pα → pk)
) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn). (22)
Since (ps → (pα → pk)) is equivalent to (ps ∧ pα → pk), it follows from (20), (22) and the fact that (by AGM1) B∗K (p1 ∨· · · ∨ pn) is deductively closed, that ((ps ∧ pα → pk)∧ (pk → ¬pα)) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) so that (ps ∧ pα → ¬pα) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨· · · ∨ pn). But (ps ∧ pα → ¬pα) is equivalent to (ps → ¬pα). Hence (ps → ¬pα) ∈ B∗K (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn), contradicting (21).
Thus we have shown that f (Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G); since f (Ek) = f +(Ek), it follows that f +(Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G).
It only remains to show that there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that E j ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅. Since f +(G) = ⋃ j∈ J f (E j), it
follows that there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that f (E j) = f (E j) ∩ f +(G). By deﬁnition of choice frame, ∅ 	= f (E j) ⊆ E j .
Thus E j ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅. 
Lemma 20. Let F = 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a choice frame and let 〈E1, . . . , En, En+1〉 be a sequence in E such that En+1 = E1 and, ∀k =
1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅. Let G = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En and let F+ = 〈Ω,E+, f +〉 be an extension of F such that (i) E+ = E ∪ {G} and
(ii) ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, if Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅ then f +(Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G). Then, for every k = 1, . . . ,n
if Ek+1 ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅ then
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅
and
Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) = f (Ek)∩ Ek+1.
(23)
Proof. Fix a k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and assume that Ek+1 ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅. Then, by hypothesis (ii), f (Ek+1) = Ek+1 ∩ f +(G). Thus
Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) = Ek ∩ Ek+1 ∩ f +(G). (24)
By hypothesis, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅. Thus, by (24), Ek ∩ Ek+1 ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅ so that
Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅. (25)
It follows from (25) and hypothesis (ii) that f (Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G), so that
f (Ek)∩ Ek+1 = Ek ∩ Ek+1 ∩ f +(G). (26)
From (24) and (26) we get that Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) = f (Ek)∩ Ek+1. 
Corollary 21. Let F = 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be a choice frame and let 〈E1, . . . , En, En+1〉 be a sequence in E such that En+1 = E1 and, ∀k =
1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅. Let G = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En and let F+ = 〈Ω,E+, f +〉 be an extension of F such that (i) E+ = E ∪ {G},
(ii) ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, if Ek ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅ then f +(Ek) = Ek ∩ f +(G) and (iii) there exists a j ∈ {0, . . . ,n−1} such that E j+1 ∩ f +(G) 	=
∅. Then, for every k = 1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) = f (Ek)∩ Ek+1 .
Proof. By Lemma 20, E j ∩ f (E j+1) = f (E j) ∩ E j+1 and E j ∩ f +(G) 	= ∅. Thus applying the lemma again we get E j−1 ∩
f (E j) = f (E j−1) ∩ E j (taking j − 1 = n if j = 1). Repeating this argument n − 1 times (interpreting j − r as n − ( j − r) if
j − r < 1) yields the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Let F = 〈Ω,E, f 〉 be an AGM-consistent choice frame where Ω is a (possibly inﬁnite) countable
set. Let 〈E1, . . . , En, En+1〉 be a sequence in E such that En+1 = E1 and, ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) 	= ∅. By Lemma 19 and
Corollary 21, for every k = 1, . . . ,n, Ek ∩ f (Ek+1) = f (Ek) ∩ Ek+1. It follows from Proposition 6 that 〈Ω,E, f 〉 is rationaliz-
able. 
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